KUWAIT: Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a panel discussion, on Sunday, on "Decision Making: The Liberation of Kuwait”. The discussion was with Dr Richard Haass, Former Special Assistant to President George HW Bush in 1989-1993 and was moderated by Sheikh Nawaf Saud Al-Sabah, CEO of KPC at Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah Kuwaiti Diplomatic Institute.
During the discussion, former US diplomat Haass highlighted how the Iraqi invasion was not just a geopolitical crisis but became a deeply personal issue for President George HW Bush. "In the early days of the crisis, Arab leaders urged the US to avoid overreacting, believing they could convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw. However, as diplomatic efforts failed, frustration grew within the Bush administration,” he recalled.
Haass explained that the meeting with Kuwait’s Amir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah in late September 1990 reinforced the views that the crisis was not just about international law or oil but about the survival of a country and its people, adding "Kuwait’s ambassador, Sheikh Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah, played a key role in making the situation personal for American leaders. Unlike the traditional, reserved diplomat, Sheikh Saud was emotional and direct, ensuring that US officials understood the human toll of Iraq’s occupation.”


"The visit also added a new urgency to US policy. Bush began to see the situation in black-and-white terms either Kuwait would be freed, or the aggression would be allowed to stand, with consequences for global order. This shift in mindset accelerated the path to military intervention,” he said. Haass emphasized that history could have taken a different course had another leader been in the White House, arguing that Bush’s moral clarity and personal investment in Kuwait’s fate played a decisive role in shaping US policy.
"Had someone else been president, the United States might have pursued a different approach perhaps - one of containment rather than liberation,” he said. He believes Kuwait’s efforts to humanize the crisis were instrumental in securing the international coalition that ultimately led to the country’s liberation, stating "The combination of strong Kuwaiti advocacy and Bush’s unwavering stance ensured that the invasion of Kuwait would not be tolerated setting a precedent for how the US would respond to future global conflicts.”
The discussion delved into critical moments of US policy-making, particularly in the late 1960s when the President of the United States Richard Nixon administration first faced questions about Gulf security. He noted that in 1968, during a meeting between then-President-elect Nixon and Kuwait’s Amir Sheikh Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, concerns about regional stability surfaced specifically, what the US stance would be if Iraq ever threatened Kuwait.
At the time, he recalled, the United States was deeply entrenched in the Vietnam War, and the Gulf region was not a top priority in Washington’s strategic calculations. "The Nixon Doctrine, developed in the late 1960s, was designed to shift the burden of regional defense to local allies, with the US providing arms rather than deploying troops,” he explained. However, as events unfolded over the following decades, American engagement in the region evolved significantly. Haass pointed out that his work on National Security Directive 26 under President Bush expanded the US commitment beyond external threats to include internal instability within the Gulf States, saying "We were primarily concerned with Iran at the time.”
Iraq was viewed as a potential partner rather than an imminent threat. But the situation had changed dramatically. As tensions between Iraq and Kuwait escalated, he noted that despite early challenges, Bush’s firm stance ultimately shaped the course of history, adding "By January 1991, a UN-backed coalition launched Operation Desert Storm, leading to the liberation of Kuwait in just over a month. In hindsight, officials say, the moment Bush uttered those decisive words "this will not stand” was the moment the course of action became inevitable.”